Limited rationality and strategic interaction: the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia by Fehr, Ernst & Tyran, Jean R
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
Limited rationality and strategic interaction: the impact of the
strategic environment on nominal inertia
Fehr, E; Tyran, J R
Fehr, E; Tyran, J R (2008). Limited rationality and strategic interaction: the impact of the strategic environment on
nominal inertia. Econometrica, 76(2):353-394.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Econometrica 2008, 76(2):353-394.
Fehr, E; Tyran, J R (2008). Limited rationality and strategic interaction: the impact of the strategic environment on
nominal inertia. Econometrica, 76(2):353-394.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Econometrica 2008, 76(2):353-394.
Limited rationality and strategic interaction: the impact of the
strategic environment on nominal inertia
Abstract
Much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational,
forward-looking decisions. This raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive for
aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results. We examine this
question in the context of a long-standing and important economic problem: the adjustment of nominal
prices after an anticipated monetary shock. Our experiments suggest that two types of bounded
rationality - money illusion and anchoring - are important behavioral forces behind nominal inertia.
However, depending on the strategic environment, bounded rationality has vastly different effects on
aggregate price adjustment. If agents' actions are strategic substitutes, adjustment to the new equilibrium
is extremely quick, whereas under strategic complementarity, adjustment is both very slow and
associated with relatively large real effects. This adjustment difference is driven by price expectations,
which are very flexible and forward-looking under substitutability but adaptive and sticky under
complementarity. Moreover, subjects' expectations are also considerably more rational under
substitutability. KEYWORDS: Bounded rationality, strategic substitutes, strategic complements, money
illusion, anchoring, nominal rigidity, sticky prices.
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Much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make 
rational, forward-looking decisions. This raises the question as to when the rational types are 
decisive for aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results. 
We examine this question in the context of a long-standing and important economic problem: the 
adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated monetary shock. Our experiments suggest that 
two types of bounded rationality – money illusion and anchoring – are important behavioral forces 
behind nominal inertia. However, depending on the strategic environment, bounded rationality has 
vastly different effects on aggregate price adjustment. If agents’ actions are strategic substitutes, 
adjustment to the new equilibrium is extremely quick, whereas under strategic complementarity, 
adjustment is both very slow and associated with relatively large real effects. This adjustment 
difference is driven by price expectations, which are very flexible and forward-looking under 
substitutability but adaptive and sticky under complementarity. Moreover, subjects’ expectations 
are also considerably more rational under substitutability.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Bounded rationality, strategic substitutes, strategic complements, money 
illusion, anchoring, nominal rigidity, sticky prices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A large body of evidence now suggests that, at the level of individual decision-making, a 
substantial number of the people violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in 
most economic models (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), Camerer (1995), 
Crawford (1997), Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta 
(2001), Camerer (2003)). However, this evidence does not imply that individual 
deviations from rationality necessarily falsify the aggregate predictions of rational choice 
models. In competitive experimental markets with agents trading standardized, non-risky 
goods, for example, prices and quantities typically converge quickly and reliably to the 
competitive equilibrium derived from individual rationality assumptions (Smith (1962, 
1982)). Gode and Sunder (1993) have shown that even programmed players with “zero 
intelligence” quickly converge to the competitive equilibrium. Thus, there are conditions 
in which deviations from individual rationality have little effect on aggregate outcomes.  
It would, however, also be a mistake to assume that interactions in competitive 
markets always eradicate the impact of bounded rationality. Theoretical work by Akerlof 
and Yellen (1985), Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989) and Russell and Thaler (1985) 
shows that there are plausible conditions under which even a small fraction of boundedly 
rational agents may have important effects on aggregate results. Moreover, empirical work 
by Camerer (1987) and Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) suggests that individual 
deviations from full rationality can have a significant impact on competitive market 
outcomes. In view of these results, the key question, therefore, is to identify the conditions 
under which limited rationality occurs and when it affects aggregate outcomes in 
economic interactions.  
In this paper, we tackle this question experimentally in the context of an important 
economic problem – the sluggish adjustment of nominal prices after a fully anticipated 
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and exogenous monetary shock. For decades, macroeconomists have examined the 
microfoundations of nominal price stickiness, because it is widely believed that nominal 
inertia is a main reason for the short-run non-neutrality of money. Much of the literature 
has emphasized informational (Lucas (1972), Mankiw and Reis (2002)), contractual 
(Fischer (1977), Taylor (1979)), and other (Mankiw (1985), Ball and Romer (1991)) 
frictions as causes of nominal inertia. There is, however, still considerable disagreement 
about the extent and the sources of nominal price inertia (see, e.g., Blinder, Canetti, 
Lebow, and Rudd (1998), Romer (2001)). Since we explicitly examine determinants of 
nominal price stickiness, our experiments not only shed light on when limits to rationality 
prevail and matter at the aggregate level, but they also contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the sources of nominal inertia. We show, in particular, that – in the 
absence of any exogenous frictions or costs of price adjustment – the strategic 
environment is a decisive factor, shaping price expectations and the extent of nominal 
price stickiness.  
The theoretical work of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) inspired our experimental 
design. They show that a given share of agents with non-rational, adaptive, expectations 
influences the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium in varying degrees, depending on 
the extent to which agents’ actions are strategic complements. Their model suggests that 
boundedly rational players have a smaller impact on the adjustment of prices after an 
anticipated monetary shock when strategic substitutability prevails than when 
complementarity prevails.2  
As a consequence, one would expect less nominal inertia under substitutability. The 
intuition behind this prediction is that the rational individuals have an incentive to partly 
mimic the behavior of the boundedly rational players under complementarity while they 
have an incentive to do the opposite of what the boundedly rational players do under 
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substitutability. Therefore, the rational players amplify the effects of players with adaptive 
expectations under complementarity while they weaken the effects of adaptive players 
under substitutability.  
However, there is little empirical work which examines how strategic substitutes 
and complements affect aggregate behavior differentially. In particular there seems to be 
no empirical evidence regarding how the strategic environment affects the nature and the 
speed of price adjustment after a nominal shock.3 Therefore, we implemented a price 
setting game with a complements and a substitutes condition in which subjects 
simultaneously choose nominal prices in every period. We implemented a fully 
anticipated monetary shock in both conditions and ensured that any exogenous frictions 
for nominal price adjustment were absent. This means that if all subjects have rational 
expectations about the other players’ actions and play a best reply to their expectations, 
the monetary shock leads to complete and instantaneous adjustment in both the 
complements and the substitutes treatment. However, the results of our experiments 
suggest that two psychological forces – money illusion and anchoring – inhibit nominal 
price adjustment after a fully anticipated negative monetary shock. In our context, money 
illusion means that subjects take nominal incomes as a proxy for real incomes, implying 
that they prefer price vectors that yield high nominal incomes. Subjects with money 
illusion thus tend to resist a general reduction in prices because it is associated with lower 
nominal incomes. Anchoring means that subjects start adjusting their behavior towards an 
optimal or correct solution from a salient reference point, or anchor. If subjects are 
uncertain about the optimal or correct solution, they often tend to make insufficient 
adjustments (Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004)) towards 
the correct solution.4 In our context, the pre-shock equilibrium price represents a natural 
anchor because subjects played the pre-shock equilibrium for many periods. Thus, if 
subjects are uncertain about the correct response to the monetary shock, they may adjust 
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prices insufficiently towards the new equilibrium. Money illusion and anchoring are the 
two forms of bounded rationality that constitute the psychological raw material for our 
study. They enable us to examine how the strategic environment transforms bounded 
rationality into aggregate outcomes that deviate or are close to the predictions of models 
with only rational agents.  
Our results show that the strategic environment indeed plays a decisive role. Under 
strategic complementarity, long-lasting nominal inertia prevails after the monetary shock. 
This result contrasts sharply with behavior under strategic substitutability where 
adjustment is extremely rapid. In fact, we cannot reject the hypothesis in the substitutes 
treatment that nominal prices are instantaneously in equilibrium after the shock, while the 
hypothesis of equilibrium play can be rejected for 8 periods in the complements treatment. 
We can also show that these treatment differences are driven by the fact that price 
expectations are very flexible in the substitutes treatment and very sticky in the 
complements treatment. These results suggest that the distinction between 
complementarity and substitutability is critical for understanding the nature and the extent 
of nominal inertia.  
In principle, the strategic environment may affect the impact of bounded rationality 
on aggregate outcomes in two ways. First, it may amplify or weaken the effects of a given 
amount of individual irrationality. We demonstrate this effect in our context by means of a 
simulation. The simulation shows that a fixed percentage of adaptive players generally 
causes a much slower adjustment towards equilibrium in the complements condition. The 
fact that adjustment in the complements condition is indeed much slower in our 
experiments may be interpreted as support for this effect. However, our data also suggests 
that the first effect cannot be the whole story. The strong differences in price expectations 
across treatments indicate, in particular, that additional forces must also be at work 
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because if the percentage of adaptive players is the same across treatments, we should also 
observe the same percentage of adaptive expectations.  
Second, the strategic environment may change the amount of individual-level 
irrationality. We find evidence for this effect, i.e., money illusion and anchoring have a 
much smaller impact on adjustment behavior in the substitutes treatment. Under 
substitutability the players appear to be considerably more rational and also seem to 
attribute more rationality to the other players. 49 percent of the subjects in the substitutes 
condition have rational expectations following the implementation of the monetary shock 
while only 26 percent exhibit rational expectations in the complements condition. 
Moreover, roughly twice as many subjects in the substitutes condition already exhibit 
equilibrium expectations in the first post-shock period, suggesting that the players 
attribute more rationality to the other players in this condition. This pattern contrasts 
sharply with the complements condition, where many subjects believe that the other 
players choose prices close to the pre-shock equilibrium.  
Why do more players have rational expectations in the substitutes treatment? We 
hypothesize that this is due to the fact that adaptive expectations imply a much larger 
expectations error in the substitutes treatment compared to the complements treatment; 
therefore, the error is (i) more salient and (ii) involves higher economic costs under 
substitutability. The higher saliency of the error means that detecting the error is less 
cognitively costly; the higher economic cost associated with the error implies that the 
gains from avoiding the error are higher. Intuitively, the higher saliency and economic 
cost of the error associated with adaptive expectations under strategic substitutability is 
the consequence of the fact that a rational player has an incentive to choose an action that 
is very different (“far away”) from that of an adaptive player. This big difference means 
that the mistake associated with adaptive expectations is very salient and the payoff gain 
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from playing rationally is relatively large. In contrast, under strategic complementarity, a 
rational player has an incentive to follow an irrational crowd, meaning that the rational 
players choose actions similar to those of the adaptive players. This small difference 
means that the mistake associated with adaptive expectations is less salient and the payoff 
gains from playing rationally are relatively small compared to those from playing 
adaptively. In fact, we observe that significantly fewer subjects exhibit rational 
expectations under strategic complementarity. This suggests that the degree of rationality 
should not be taken as exogenously given. Instead, rationality should be viewed as a 
variable that responds to the cognitive costs of detecting an error (i.e., to how salient an 
error is) and to the economic cost of committing it. Our evidence may, therefore, be 
interpreted as support for theories that endogenize the rationality with which people form 
expectations (Evans and Ramey (1992, 1998), Brock and Hommes (1997), Reis (2006)).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss our 
experimental design. In Section 3 we present our results. Section 4 discusses to what 
extent various theories of nominal inertia are consistent with our data and Section 5 
summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A main purpose of our experiments was to examine how bounded rationality affects the 
adjustment of nominal prices in different strategic environments. We conjectured, in 
particular, that money illusion5 and anchoring may cause a slow adjustment of nominal 
prices after an anticipated monetary shock. Several studies (Shafir, Tversky, and Diamond 
(1997), Kooreman, Faber, and Hofmans (2004), Basu, Markov, and Shivakumar (2006), 
Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005), Brunnermeier and Julliard (forthcoming)) now 
indicate that a non-negligible share of the people exhibit money illusion. The evidence in 
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Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) suggests, for example, that money illusion even 
affects aggregate stock market behavior. Experimental work by Fehr and Tyran (2001, 
2007) also shows that a non-negligible share of the subjects exhibits money illusion in 
price setting games where payoff information is given to the subjects in nominal terms.6 
Conjecturing that subjects in our price setting experiments may also be prone to money 
illusion if they are confronted with a nominal payoff representation therefore seems 
natural.  
A relatively large psychological literature (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1974), 
Strack and Mussweiler (1997), Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004), as well as some 
economic applications (e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003)), suggest that 
anchoring may affect people’s behavior quite strongly. For example, arbitrary anchors 
affect subjects’ reservation prices for various goods in the experiments of Ariely, 
Loewenstein, and Prelec. Before these authors elicited reservation prices in an incentive 
compatible way, the subjects had to state the last two digits of their social security 
numbers. Then they were asked whether they are willing to pay a larger or smaller amount 
of dollars than this number for the good in question. After this initial question subjects 
stated their explicit reservation prices. The results show that the anchoring question – 
whether subjects are willing to pay more or less than the last two digits of their social 
security numbers for the good – had a strong impact on reservation prices: the higher the 
social security number, the higher the stated reservation price. This effect was also present 
if subjects participated in a competitive auction for the good in question.  
There is no unambiguously correct answer in the case of the elicitation of 
reservation prices because these are inherently subjective. However, much research on 
anchoring in tasks with objectively correct solutions (Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004)) 
indicates that many subjects insufficiently adjust their answers towards the correct 
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solution if they are uncertain about what the correct solution is. Anchoring and 
insufficient adjustment may also affect subjects’ behavior after an anticipated monetary 
shock. Subjects may be anchored on the previous equilibrium price, and this anchoring is 
particularly plausible if the previous equilibrium price prevailed for a considerable time. 
In addition, if subjects are uncertain about what the rational expectation or the rational 
action after the shock is – perhaps because they are uncertain about what the other players 
do – the adjustment may be insufficient in much the same way as adjustment is 
insufficient in many psychological anchoring experiments.  
 
2.1. General Description of the Experimental Design – Main Treatments 
In order to study how bounded rationality affects behavior in different strategic 
environments, we implemented a price setting game in which both money illusion and 
anchoring could play a role. Money illusion could play a role because subjects in our main 
treatments received payoff information in nominal terms. Anchoring could play a role 
because we implemented a pre-shock phase in which subjects had sufficient time to 
converge to the equilibrium of this phase and to play this equilibrium for several periods. 
We implemented a negative monetary shock after subjects had played the equilibrium for 
several periods. In the following we describe the two main treatments.  
Our price setting game was implemented in two versions – a complements treatment 
(CT) and a substitutes treatment (ST). Since we were interested in adjustment dynamics, 
the price setting game was repeated for a finite number of periods. The same unique 
equilibrium at the stage-game level existed in both treatments. The only difference 
between the two treatments was that the slope of each subject’s best reply function was 
positive in the stage game of the CT while the slope was negative but had the same 
absolute value in the ST. In each period, the subjects simultaneously chose a nominal 
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price. In addition, they indicated their expectations of the average nominal price of the 
other subjects. At the end of the period, each subject was informed about the average 
nominal price of the others and about the payoff in that period. The subjects moved to the 
next period after the information feedback. The experiment was divided into a pre- and a 
post-shock phase of equal length, and we implemented an exogenous and fully anticipated 
nominal shock at the beginning of the post-shock phase. The shock was anticipated by the 
players because it was announced at the beginning of the first post-shock period, before 
they had made their decision in that period. We study the impact of the strategic 
environment on adjustment dynamics by comparing price adjustment after the shock 
across the CT and the ST.  
At the beginning of this project, the stage game was a price setting game with 
monopolistic competition. It turned out, however, that – for our purposes – this design had 
two major drawbacks. First, and most importantly, it is not possible to move from 
strategic complementarity to strategic substitutability within the context of monopolistic 
competition, while keeping everything else constant. If one changes the slope of the 
reaction functions, one in general also changes equilibrium prices, the real payoffs in 
equilibrium, the number of dominated strategies, and the real payoffs in the neighborhood 
of best replies. Thus, it is not possible to conduct a clean comparison between the impact 
of strategic complements and strategic substitutes in the context of monopolistic 
competition. Second, the equilibrium under monopolistic competition is not efficient and 
this hinders the adjustment towards equilibrium. The existence of an inefficient 
equilibrium means that subjects can earn more money if they try to collude and thus 
prevent adjustment towards equilibrium. These efforts to collude in turn introduce some 
nominal inertia after the announcement of the shock which is then confounded with the 
amount of nominal inertia that stems from the strategic complementarity or substitutability 
that we implemented via the monetary payoff functions.  
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This problem can also be viewed as one of unobservable strategic complementarity. 
It is well known that many subjects exhibit preferences for conditional cooperation in the 
presence of cooperation opportunities (see, e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) or 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2002)). They are willing to cooperate if others cooperate as well. 
Since we cannot directly observe subjects’ preferences for conditional cooperation, this 
introduces unobservable strategic complementarity, i.e. we lose control over the precise 
amount of complementarity. We conducted pilot experiments with monopolistic 
competition, which confirmed these problems. After the nominal shock, subjects tried 
hard to reap the gains from collusion, which strongly retarded adjustment towards 
equilibrium. Note that this means that strategic complementarity is not necessarily a 
feature of the objectively given technology of interaction. Subjective preferences may also 
be an important source of strategic complementarity that adds to nominal inertia. Yet, 
since we wanted to have full control over the extent of strategic complementarity or 
substitutability, we ruled out that preferences for conditional cooperation can play a role 
in our experiments by implementing the following design features.7  
First, we implemented a unique, money-neutral and efficient Nash equilibrium in 
both treatments. In fact, the Nash equilibrium was the only efficient point in payoff space. 
This feature rules out collusion and conditional cooperation as a decelerator in adjustment 
towards equilibrium. Since the equilibrium is neutral with regard to the nominal shock 
variable (money supply), any real effects of the nominal shock must be associated with 
out-of-equilibrium behavior. Second, equilibrium prices and real equilibrium payoffs do 
not change across the CT and the ST. Third, real payoffs along the reaction functions are 
also the same across CT and ST. Forth, if a player deviated from best reply behavior, the 
real income loss for a given deviation from the best reply is also identical across 
treatments. Fifth, the number of strictly dominated strategies within the range of feasible 
price choices is identical across CT and ST after the shock. Thus, the players faced exactly 
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the same incentives to play best replies in both treatments. Finally, if the subjects play a 
best reply to the expected price choices of the other players, a given expectations error 
causes exactly the same monetary loss for a subject in the CT and the ST. Taken together, 
these design features mean that the only difference between the treatments concerned the 
slope of the reaction function. If, at a given price vector in the CT, the slope was z > 0, 
then the slope in the ST was given by -z < 0 at that price vector.  
In each experimental session, we formed several groups of n players who played the 
pricing game for T periods. The group composition remained unchanged throughout the 
session. The money supply was given by M0 during the first T/2 periods of a session. Then 
we implemented a fully anticipated monetary shock by reducing the money supply to M1 
(see Table I for a complete list of parameters). All subjects were informed about the shock 
at the beginning of the post-shock phase, before making their decision in the first post-
shock period. This shock and the fact that the post-shock phase lasted another 15 periods 
was common information. We were only interested in comparing subjects’ pricing 
behavior across treatments in the post-shock phase. The pre-shock phase served the 
purpose of familiarizing subjects with the computer terminal and the decision 
environment. In addition, the pre-shock phase allowed subjects to reach an equilibrium in 
that phase and to play that equilibrium for several periods. This is important, as we wanted 
to study how the strategic environment affects adjustment to a purely nominal shock after 
subjects had already reached the money-neutral equilibrium. This ensures that the 
adjustment requirements are the same across treatments.  
The real payoff of subject i was given by 
(1) vi = vi(Pi, iP− , M) = vi(Pi/M, iP− /M, 1),  
where Pi denotes i’s nominal price, iP−  represents the nominal average price of the other 
n-1 group members, while M denotes a common nominal shift variable (money supply). 
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The real payoff function vi(.) is homogenous of degree zero in ,Pi iP− , and M so that real 
payoffs can be written as a function of Pi/M and iP− /M. Since we implemented a unique 
equilibrium, homogeneity of degree zero ensured that the equilibrium was neutral in 
money.8 Note also that, for a given money supply, the optimal choice of Pi only depends 
on the average price of the other players and not on the other players’ individual prices. 
This means that subjects need not form expectations about other players’ individual 
prices, but only about the average price iP− . In addition, this payoff function has the 
advantage that, for a given money supply, we can represent the subjects’ payoffs in a 
matrix that informs subjects about their payoffs at any feasible ( ii PP −, )-combination.  
 
2.2. Experimental Procedures, Parameters, and Subject Pool 
All major experimental parameters and design features of the two main treatments are 
summarized in Appendix A and Table I. The experimental instructions for the subjects are 
presented in Appendix B (see supplementary online material)9. The experiment was 
conducted with the software Z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)) in a computerized laboratory. We 
implemented groups of size n = 4 and the experiment lasted T = 30 periods. There were 
two types of subjects in each group: subjects of type x and subjects of type y. The two 
types have slightly different payoff functions, where the best reply of the x-types involved 
slightly lower prices than the best reply of the y-types. Since heterogeneity is a fact of life, 
a case with four different payoff functions would be most realistic, but also most 
complicated. Therefore, we chose an intermediate solution with only two types of players. 
A total of 76 students from the University of Zurich participated in main treatments. Each 
subject participated either in the CT or in the ST. In the pre-shock phase of each 
treatment, the money supply was given by M0 = 42, while in the post shock phase, it was 
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given by M1 = M0/2 = 21. In the pre-shock equilibrium, the average price over all n group 
members was given by 0*P = 25, while the post-shock equilibrium price was 1*P  = 12.5.  
* Insert Table I about here *  
The subjects had to choose a nominal price ∈{1,2,3,…,30} in each period. In 
addition, they had to provide an expectation about 
Pi
P i− , which we denote by P i
e
− . At the 
end of each period, each subject was informed about the actual value of P i− , and the 
actual real payoff v  on a so-called outcome-screen (see Appendix B in supplementary 
online material). In addition, the outcome screen provided information about the subject’s 
past choices of , past values of 
i
Pi P i− , and past real payoffs . vi
Subjects received the payoff information in the form of a matrix which has the 
advantage that the payoffs from different ( , Pi P i− )-combinations are easy to figure out. In 
Appendix C and D (in the supplementary online material), we provide the post-shock 
payoff matrices for the x- and y-types for both treatment conditions. Appendix C shows 
the real payoffs for any feasible ( ,iP iP− )-combination, whereas Appendix D shows the 
nominal payoffs. As we wanted to allow for the possibility of money illusion affecting 
subjects’ behavior we gave them only nominal payoff tables in our main treatments. The 
real payoff tables in Appendix C of our paper were only used in the control treatments 
described in the next subsection. The real payoff tables make it immediately transparent 
that, except for the slope of the best reply functions, the real payoff structure was kept 
constant across the substitutes and the complements treatment. To render the difference 
across treatments transparent, we have also shaded the best reply functions in Appendix C. 
Subjects, of course, never received payoff tables with shaded best replies.10 In subjects’ 
nominal payoff tables, the matrix showed the nominal payoff Vi = iP− vi for each feasible 
( ,iP iP− )-combination. To compute the real payoff for a particular ( P Pi , −i ) combination, a 
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subject had to divide Vi = iP− vi by iP− . This was described at some length in the 
instructions (see Appendix B in the supplementary online material). To inform subjects 
about the payoffs of the other type, each subject also received the payoff matrix of the 
other type. This information was common knowledge. 
At the end of period 15, the nominal shock was implemented in the following way: 
subjects were publicly informed that x- and y-types would receive new payoff tables. 
These tables were based on M1 = M0/2. Again, each subject received his or her own payoff 
table and the table of the other type. Subjects were told that, except for payoff tables, 
everything else, including group composition, would remain unchanged. They were given 
enough time to study the new payoff tables and to choose  for period 16.Pi
11 This 
procedure ensures that, in period 16, subjects face an exogenous, fully anticipated and 
negative nominal shock: it is exogenous because subjects’ behavior does not affect the 
timing or the content of the new payoff tables. It is fully anticipated because the new 
tables were distributed before subjects had to decide and because the distribution of new 
tables was common knowledge. At the beginning of period 16, it was common knowledge 
that the experiment would last for a further 15 periods. 
Note that there are no exogenous frictions present in this design: there are no 
nominal frictions, since nominal prices can be changed from period to period at no cost. 
There are no informational frictions, since subjects are given full information about the 
shock. 
In total, we had 10 groups in the CT and 9 groups in the ST in our main treatments. 
The experiments took place at the University of Zurich and the subjects were 
undergraduate students from different disciplines. They were paid a show-up fee of 
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roughly $8 (CHF 10) and their earnings from the experiment were on average $28 (CHF 
34). An experimental session lasted approximately 80 minutes. 
 
2.3. Identifying Money Illusion and Anchoring  
The main treatments described in the previous two subsections ensure that both money 
illusion and anchoring can affect subjects’ behavior. However, we need further control 
treatments in order to show that these psychological forces contribute to nominal inertia 
and disequilibrium play in our price setting experiment. For this purpose, we implemented 
four additional treatment conditions where we added a third phase – the restart phase – 
after the post-shock phase (see Table II). The restart phase constitutes a simple restart of 
the experiment with the same money supply as in the post-shock phase. The fact that 
merely restarting an identical experiment sometimes causes substantial disequilibrium 
behavior at the beginning of the restart is the motivation for the implementation of the 
restart phase. Andreoni (1988) and Croson (1995), for example, have shown that the mere 
restart of a finitely repeated public goods experiment causes a strong increase in 
cooperation levels despite the fact that most subjects played the equilibrium strategy of 
complete free-riding at the end of the previous (identical) experiment. Because the 
implementation of the monetary shock inevitably involves a restart of the experiment, 
albeit with a different money supply, we cannot be sure whether the change in the money 
supply or the restart feature of the monetary shock causes disequilibrium play after the 
shock. Therefore, the comparison between price adjustment in the post-shock phase and 
the restart phase can answer the question whether a mere restart causes disequilibrium 
prices and to what extent a disequilibrium observed in the post-shock phase is likely to 
represent a restart effect.  
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In our first control treatment (denoted “CT-restart-real”) we implemented the 
complements treatment with real payoff tables in all three phases – the pre-shock, the 
post-shock and the restart phase – for 4 groups (see Table II). We implemented the 
substitutes treatment with real payoff tables in all three phases for 3 groups in the second 
control treatment (denoted “ST-restart-real”). In our third control treatment (CT-restart-
nominal), 4 groups received real payoff tables in the first two phases (pre- and post-shock) 
but at the beginning of the restart phase subjects received nominal payoff tables. Finally, 3 
groups received real payoff tables in the pre- and the post-shock phase and nominal payoff 
tables in the restart phase in our fourth control treatment (ST-restart-nominal). Because 
CT-restart-real and CT-restart-nominal are identical in the pre- and post-shock phases, we 
label the corresponding 8 groups CT-real, and the 6 groups with substitutes ST-real in 
these two phases (see Table II). 
* Insert Table II about here * 
These four control conditions enable us to isolate the impact of money illusion, 
anchoring, and the restart feature of the monetary shock on price adjustment. In all four 
control conditions we implemented real payoff tables in the pre-shock and the post-shock 
phase; hence money illusion could play no role after the shock in these treatments. Thus, 
if nominal inertia during the post-shock phase is larger in the presence of nominal payoff 
tables, we can conclude that money illusion slows down price adjustment after the shock. 
However, anchoring can still play a role when subjects receive real payoff tables because 
the new equilibrium requires lower nominal prices after the monetary shock, but subjects 
may be anchored on the pre-shock equilibrium that they played for several periods. 
Therefore, if we observe that subjects choose nominal prices close to the pre-shock 
equilibrium in the post-shock phase of the control treatments, we can conclude that 
anchoring contributes to disequilibrium play after the shock.  
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Our control treatments also enable us to see what happens if neither money illusion 
nor anchoring can affect subjects’ behavior. This is the case in the restart phase with real 
payoffs, i.e., in the restart phase of CT-real and ST-real. Anchoring (i.e., insufficient 
adjustment) effects cannot occur in the restart phase because – from the viewpoint of 
equilibrium play – there is no need for adjusting nominal prices, and money illusion 
cannot occur in these treatments because payoffs are provided in real terms. Therefore, if 
anchoring and money illusion are the only sources of disequilibrium play in the post-
shock phase, we should not observe any disequilibrium play in the restart phase of CT-real 
and ST-real. However, if the restart feature of the post-shock phase is also a source of 
disequilibrium play after the monetary shock, then we should also observe disequilibrium 
play in the restart phase. Disequilibrium play in the restart phase of CT-real and ST-real 
is, therefore, an unambiguous indicator of a restart effect.  
Finally, the treatments where we implement nominal payoff tables in the restart 
phase (CT-restart-nominal, ST-restart-nominal) provide a further independent measure of 
the existence of money illusion in our price setting game. We rule out any anchoring 
effects in the restart phase of these treatments because there is no need for nominal price 
adjustment after the restart. However, as subjects now receive nominal instead of real 
payoff tables, money illusion may now constitute an independent source of disequilibrium 
play in the restart phase, causing a larger disequilibrium than the mere restart effect that 
might occur with real payoff tables. If some subjects take nominal incomes as a proxy for 
real incomes, they may choose prices above the equilibrium regardless of whether they are 
in the substitutes or the complements condition. If instead, subjects only believe that 
others behave in this way, while they themselves are not prone to money illusion, we 
should see that subjects in the CT choose prices that are too high relative to equilibrium, 
while subjects in the ST choose prices that are too low. Thus, the pattern of actual and 
expected price choices across the substitutes and complements treatment also gives us a 
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hint whether money illusion, or the expectation about others’ money illusion, is a source 
of disequilibrium play.  
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Adjustment of Prices 
To what extent do different strategic environments affect the adjustment of prices towards 
the post-shock equilibrium? A first impression is provided by Figure 1, which plots the 
evolution of pre- and post-shock average prices across main treatments. The figure 
indicates that nominal prices quickly approach the average equilibrium price in the pre-
shock phase, which is given by 0*P = 25. Except for periods 1 and 2, the hypothesis that 
pre-shock prices in the ST and the CT are in equilibrium can never be rejected.12 The 
situation changes dramatically, however, after the nominal shock. In the first post-shock 
period, average prices in the CT are far above the equilibrium, whereas in the ST prices 
slightly overshoot relative to the equilibrium. Moreover, according to Figure 1, it takes a 
large number of periods until nominal prices in the CT have fully adjusted. Not until 
period 27, twelve periods after the shock, do CT-prices seem to be fully back to 
equilibrium. This contrasts sharply with the price dynamics in the ST, where full 
adjustment already seems to be achieved in the second period after the shock.  
* Insert Figure 1 about here * 
To examine the deviations from equilibrium more rigorously, we conducted the 
following regression for the post-shock phase:  
(2)  )1(
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where jtP denotes the average price of group j in period t,  represents the average 
equilibrium price after the shock, and d
1*P
−
t = 1 if the price observation in period t comes 
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from the CT.13 The coefficients αt measure the deviation from equilibrium in the CT, 
whereas the coefficients βt measure the deviation in the ST. We have summarized the 
results of regression (2) in Table III. The absolute size of the coefficients in Table III 
informs us how much average group prices deviate from equilibrium. This indicates that 
in period 16, the average price in the CT is 6.6 above equilibrium, while in the ST it is 
1.17 below equilibrium. In fact, as the significance tests indicated in Table III show, we 
can never reject the hypothesis that group average prices in the ST are in equilibrium. For 
the CT, however, the hypothesis of equilibrium play can be rejected for the first eight 
post-shock periods at the 1 percent level. Thus, Figure 1 and Table III leave little doubt 
that the strategic environment has decisive effects on adjustment dynamics.  
* Insert Table III about here * 
So far, we have only looked at average prices. However, equilibrium also requires that 
individual actions coincide with equilibrium prices. With this in mind, we constructed 
Table IV and Figures 2a and 2b. The figures graph the distribution of prices in the first 
post-shock period across treatments for the x-types (Figure 2a) and the y-types (Figure 
2b). A remarkably high percentage of the x-types (72 percent) in the ST jumps directly to 
the new equilibrium and 17 percent are just one unit above the equilibrium. In contrast, 
the majority of the x-subjects (50 percent) in the CT choose a price far above the 
equilibrium (i.e., Pi = 21) and only 25 percent jump directly to the new equilibrium. For 
the y-types, the picture is qualitatively similar: 61 percent of the subjects in the ST jump 
directly to the new equilibrium and 28 percent are only one unit above or below the 
equilibrium, whereas only 20 percent of the y-types play the equilibrium in the CT and the 
rest choose prices far above the equilibrium.  
Table IV indicates that 23 percent of the subjects play the equilibrium in the CT in 
the first two post-shock periods while 75 percent of the subjects choose prices above the 
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equilibrium. This result contrasts sharply with the ST, where 67 percent play exactly the 
equilibrium and the percentage of prices above the equilibrium equals roughly the 
percentage below the equilibrium. Table IV also shows that these differences in individual 
play across treatments persist a long time. These differences can be illustrated by 
comparing period 18 in the ST with periods 28-30 in the CT. In t = 18, 92 percent of the 
subjects in the ST already choose exactly the equilibrium price. A similar incidence of 
exact equilibrium play only occurs in the final three periods of the CT. Taken together, 
these results indicate that equilibrium adjustment is breathtakingly quick in the ST, 
whereas it is extremely slow in the CT. This suggests that the strategic environment is a 
decisive determinant of nominal inertia and shapes the impact of bounded rationality in 
important ways.   
* Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here * 
* Insert Table IV about here * 
 
3.2. Best Reply Behavior and Price Expectations 
One reason for the different adjustment patterns could be that there are differences in best 
reply behavior across treatments. Since we asked subjects for their expectations regarding 
the average price of the other players, we are able to compute the best reply for each 
subject in each period and compare it with the actual price choice.14 We did this for the 
different price intervals depicted in Figures 3a and 3b. These figures compare the average 
best reply in each interval for which we observe price expectations with the average price 
actually chosen in response to these expectations. The numbers above the bars indicate the 
relative frequency of price expectations in the different price intervals.  
* Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here * 
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Figure 3a shows that the average best reply in the CT for each expectation interval 
coincides almost exactly with the average price that was chosen in the respective interval. 
Thus, the slow adjustment in the CT cannot be attributed to deviations from best reply 
behavior. Likewise, the average best replies in the ST are very close to the actual average 
prices in the different intervals.15 From this, we conclude that the differences in 
adjustment dynamics across treatments cannot be due to differences in best reply 
behavior.  
If subjects play a best reply most of the time to the expected average price of others, 
then the differences in actual price choices across treatments are likely to be generated by 
differences in expectations. The relative frequencies in Figure 3 (see numbers above the 
bars) provide a first indication of strong treatment differences in price expectations. 60 
percent of the price expectations in the CT are at or above 19 in periods 16-18 while in the 
ST, 96 percent of the expectations are at or below 15 during these periods. To further 
examine the role of price expectations, we plotted the average expectations in both 
treatments in Figure 4. The figure indicates that average expectations are in equilibrium in 
the ST and the CT before the shock. After the shock, average expectations remain very 
sticky in the CT, but jump almost completely to the new equilibrium expectations in the 
ST. From period 17 onwards, average expectations are in equilibrium in the ST, whereas 
out-of-equilibrium expectations prevail in the CT until period 27. To examine this issue 
more rigorously, we conducted regressions analogous to equation (2). The only difference 
is that instead of using the actual deviation of group prices from the equilibrium, we take 
the deviation of the groups’ price expectations from the equilibrium expectation as the 
dependent variable. The results of this regression are displayed in Table V. The table 
shows that the average expectation in the CT in period 16 is 8.0 units above the 
equilibrium, while it is only 0.9 units above equilibrium in the ST. Moreover, we can 
reject the hypothesis that subjects in the CT have equilibrium expectations (at the five 
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percent level) for eight periods and at the ten percent level (p = 0.056) for the ninth post-
shock period, too. In the ST, the hypothesis that expectations are in equilibrium can never 
be rejected at the ten percent level.   
* Insert Figure 4 about here * 
* Insert Table V about here * 
These results suggest that the key mechanism that generates the different adjustment 
behaviors is the differential stickiness of price expectations. Whereas strategic 
substitutability causes very flexible expectations that instantaneously approach the 
equilibrium, strategic complementarity is associated with very sticky expectations. The 
players then play best replies to their expectations, so that the flexible expectations 
translate into flexible prices in the ST, while sticky expectations translate into sticky 
prices in the CT.  
 
3.3. Real Effects during Adjustment towards Equilibrium 
One important question in macroeconomics is whether anticipated monetary shocks are 
associated with real effects. To the extent to which adjustment towards equilibrium is 
slow, anticipated monetary shocks will cause real effects. Therefore, one can expect that 
the negative monetary shock causes larger reductions in the players’ joint payoffs under 
complementarity than under substitutability. To check, we computed for each group j and 
each period t how much the real average payoff of the group, v , falls short of the real 
average payoff in equilibrium v*. Based on this computation, we measure the efficiency 
loss of group j in period t by , i.e., as a percentage of the equilibrium 
payoff. In Figure 5, we present the evolution of the average value of 
j
ε jt jtv v v= −( ) /* *
ε jt  across treatments 
during the post-shock phase.  
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 * Insert Figure 5 about here * 
One has to remember when interpreting this figure that we deliberately implemented 
payoff functions that imply relatively large payoff reductions in case a subject does not 
play a best reply to the actual average price of the other players. This means that subjects 
have strong incentives to predict the average price of the others correctly, because 
otherwise they cannot play a best reply. An inevitable consequence of this payoff structure 
is that large payoff reductions are associated with out-of-equilibrium play. When 
interpreting Figure 5, therefore, we do not wish to emphasize the absolute value of ε jt . 
The difference in the average value of ε jt  across treatments is more important.  
The figure reveals that the payoff losses due to non-equilibrium play throughout the 
whole post-shock phase are much larger in the CT than in the ST. While sizeable payoff 
losses only occur in the first two post-shock periods in the ST, large losses occur until 
period 27 in the CT. This indicates that the different adjustment dynamics associated with 
strategic complements and substitutes give rise to considerably larger real effects in the 
complements condition.   
 
3.4. Money Illusion and Anchoring as Forces behind Disequilibrium Play 
What are the psychological forces behind disequilibrium play in the post-shock phase of 
the main treatment? To answer this question, we turn to our control treatments. Recall that 
the subjects face real payoff tables in all three phases of CT-restart-real and ST-restart-
real. Therefore, money illusion can play no role in these treatments. In addition, anchoring 
effects cannot play a role in the restart phase of CT-restart-real and ST-restart-real because 
there is no need to adjust nominal prices when subjects play the equilibrium in the final 
periods of the post-shock phase and then enter the restart phase. We can thus examine 
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whether there are disequilibrating forces other than money illusion and anchoring by 
examining disequilibrium play in the restart phase of CT-restart-real and ST-restart-real. If 
a restart causes a disequilibrium in these treatments, we would have to conclude that 
money illusion and anchoring are not the only forces that cause disequilibration in our 
setting. 
Figures 6a and 6b depict the path of actual prices (Figure 6a) and expected prices 
(Figure 6b) in the post-shock and restart phase of the control treatments. The figures show 
that subjects play the equilibrium in the final 10 periods of the post-shock phase of both 
CT-real and ST-real. Moreover, both actual and expected prices are instantaneously in 
equilibrium in the restart phase of the treatments with real payoff information. Thus, if 
money illusion and anchoring are ruled out, instantaneous equilibrium play occurs in the 
restart phase.  
In the next step, we examine the disequilibrium forces associated with money 
illusion by looking at the CT-restart-nominal and the ST-restart-nominal treatments. 
Recall that the subjects in the restart phase of these treatments experienced real payoff 
tables in the pre-shock and the post-shock phase but they were faced with nominal payoff 
tables in the restart phase, implying that money illusion can affect their behavior in the 
restart phase.16 Figure 6b shows that the subjects now expect prices that are above the 
equilibrium in both the substitutes and the complements treatment, despite the fact that the 
same unique equilibrium exists in the post-shock and the restart phase. Moreover, 
although these subjects expected and played the equilibrium in the preceding post-shock 
phase for 10 or more periods, they suddenly expect above-equilibrium prices at the 
beginning of the restart phase when they are given nominal payoff tables. This 
phenomenon can be taken as a strong indication that money illusion or expectations about 
other’s money illusion affect behavior in our setting. It is also interesting to see that 
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nominal payoff tables have a much stronger impact on expectations in the complements 
treatment. Price expectations in CT-restart-nominal jump 4.6 units above the equilibrium 
in the first restart period and a statistical test similar to equation (2) shows significant 
deviations (p < 0.05) for the first three restart periods. Price expectations in ST-nominal 
restart increase by only 2.2 units above the equilibrium and significant disequilibrium (p < 
0.05) only occurs for the first restart period. The existence of disequilibrium expectations 
also translates into disequilibrium play (Figure 6a). Actual prices in CT-restart-nominal 
also rise quite far above the equilibrium, whereas subjects in ST-restart-nominal best reply 
by choosing on average prices below the equilibrium. In fact, significant deviations (p < 
0.01) from equilibrium play occur in CT-restart-nominal for 3 periods whereas prices 
never deviate significantly from equilibrium in ST-nominal restart.  
* Insert Figures 6a,b about here * 
Next, we examine the impact of pure anchoring on post-shock price adjustment. The post-
shock graphs of CT-real in Figure 6a and 6b rule out any impact of money illusion on 
prices and expectations. These graphs indicate that anchoring plays an important role in 
the complements but not in the substitutes treatment. Anchoring occurs, in particular, 
during the first 4 periods of the complements treatment, where we find deviations from 
equilibrium play (by running regression (2)) at the 5 percent significance level. In 
contrast, we never observe a significant deviation from equilibrium in ST-real. Both actual 
prices and price expectations are instantaneously in equilibrium in the post-shock phase of 
ST-real.  
In addition to CT-real and ST-real, we also depicted the post-shock paths of prices 
and expectations for the main complements and substitutes treatments. We labeled these 
treatments CT-nominal and ST-nominal in Figures 6a and 6b. Comparing the nominal and 
the real treatments allows us to identify the extent to which money illusion increases 
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nominal inertia after the shock. Figure 6b shows that price expectations are much more 
sticky in the nominal complements treatments than in the real complements treatment. 
Price expectations in CT-nominal deviate significantly (at p < 0.05) from equilibrium for 
the first nine post-shock periods, whereas significant deviations occur only for 4 periods 
in CT-real. A similar result holds for actual average prices: they are significantly (p < 
0.05) above the equilibrium for 8 periods in CT-nominal, while significant deviations 
occur for only 4 periods in CT-real. Thus, money illusion clearly has a strong impact on 
post-shock nominal inertia in the complements treatment.  
The situation differs radically in the substitutes treatments. Here, neither money 
illusion nor anchoring has much impact on expectations and prices. Figure 6a and 6b as 
well as regressions analogous to equation (2) support this result. Actual prices in both ST-
nominal and ST-real never deviate significantly (at p = 0.05) from the equilibrium in the 
post-shock phase. The same holds true for price expectations in both ST-nominal and ST-
real, suggesting that the impact of bounded rationality on behavior and expectations is 
greatly diminished in the substitutes treatment.  
 
3.5. How does the Strategic Environment affect Disequilibrium Play? 
In our view, the outstanding feature of the post-shock adjustment of prices and 
expectations is how quickly equilibrium is reached in the ST relative to the CT. According 
to the approach taken by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989), the interaction between a 
given distribution of rational and adaptive players and the strategic environment can 
explain these large adjustment differences. What is important here is that the rational 
players in this approach are also assumed to anticipate the share and the behavior of the 
adaptive players correctly.  
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To illustrate how a given mix of rational and adaptive players affects the adjustment 
towards equilibrium in different strategic environments, we constructed Figures 7a and 7b. 
Both figures show simulations of price adjustment in the context of the two main 
treatments of our price setting game. The simulations are based on the parameters of the 
post-shock phase and the assumption that equilibrium has been reached in the pre-shock 
phase. We simulated post-shock price adjustment for different assumptions about the 
shares of rational and adaptive players. For simplicity, the simulations assume that the 
adaptive players have fully adaptive expectations, i.e., they expect the last period’s 
average price to prevail in this period as well. Either money illusion or anchoring could 
easily cause adaptive expectations because money illusion tends to inhibit the adjustment 
of expectations after a negative monetary shock and anchoring is naturally associated with 
sticky, backward looking, expectations. In the simulations, the rational players are also 
assumed to know the share of adaptive players and they also correctly anticipate the 
adaptive players’ price choices.  
In Figure 7a, for instance, the graph associated with (2x,2y) is based on the 
assumption that both x-types and both y-types in the group exhibit fully adaptive 
expectations in the ST. The graph shows that we should observe a cyclical adjustment 
pattern with large amplitudes, and full adjustment would only be reached in period 27. 
The graph associated with (2x,1y) assumes that both x-players but only one of the y-
players has fully adaptive expectations whereas the other y-player correctly anticipates the 
behavior of the three adaptive players. If this is the case, adjustment is also cyclical, but 
with much smaller amplitudes, and full adjustment is already reached in period 18. If only 
one of the x-players has adaptive expectations, and the others in the group are rational, 
then equilibrium in the ST is reached already in period 17 (see 1x-graph in Figure 7a). 
Figure 7b is constructed analogously for the CT.  
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A comparison of the two figures shows that if all players are fully adaptive, 
complete adjustment is only achieved in period 27 in both treatments. However, whereas 
adjustment is cyclical in the ST, the players in the CT gradually converge to the 
equilibrium from above. The big differences in adjustment speed across treatments occur 
when there are some rational players in the population, because they partly mimic the 
actions of the adaptive players in the CT, whereas they counteract the actions of the 
adaptive players in the ST. For instance, if one of the y-types is a rational player (see the 
(2x,1y)-graphs), equilibrium in the ST is reached in period 18, whereas adjustment is 
completed only in period 26 in the CT. Thus, if one or more (but not all) players are 
rational, the strategic environment has a large impact on adjustment speed.17  
* Insert Figures 7a and 7b about here * 
Figures 7a and 7b also provide a first indication that the strategic environment does 
not just amplify or weaken the effects of a given amount of bounded rationality. A very 
good fit with the actual average price path is achieved in the ST if one assumes that only 
one player is adaptive (see 1x-graph in Figure 7a). In the CT, this assumption implies that 
complete adjustment is already achieved in period 19 whereas in fact this occurs only in 
period 27. The best fit with the actual average price path is achieved in the CT if we take 
the prices actually observed in period 16 as our initial values, and assume thereafter that 
all players in the group have fully adaptive expectations. This simulation is shown in the 
graph (2x,2y, t = 16 actual) of Figure 7b. None of the other simulations in Figure 7b 
capture the features of the actual average price path in the CT. This is due to the fact that 
23 percent of the players in the CT jump directly to the equilibrium in period 16. 
However, this jump was based on wrong expectations about the behavior of the other 
players, so that thereafter the players’ expectations became very sticky. This explains why 
the best simulation after t = 16 is based on the assumption that all players have fully 
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adaptive expectations. Thus, it seems difficult to explain the actual average price path on 
the basis of the assumption that there is the same mix of rational and adaptive players 
across treatments because we have to assume a much smaller percentage of adaptive 
players in the ST in order to match the observed price changes in the post-shock phase.18 
This suggests that the strategic environment does more than just translate a given mix of 
expectation formation rules into different aggregate behaviors. Perhaps it also changes the 
players’ expectation formation rules by affecting the impact of bounded rationality on 
expectation formation.  
A first indication for strong treatment differences in expectation formation is 
provided by the pattern of individual price expectations in the first post-shock period of 
the two main treatments. There are many more players in the CT who have price 
expectations in the vicinity of fully adaptive expectations: 45 percent of the x-players and 
60 percent of the y-players have price expectations that are within 2 units of fully adaptive 
expectations. In contrast, only 6 percent of the x-players and zero percent of the y-players 
have such sticky price expectations in the ST. Thus, in the first post-shock period, the 
frequency of sticky expectations is much larger in the CT. 
Figure 6b provides more direct evidence for the hypothesis that bounded rationality 
affects expectation formation. The figure shows that subjects suddenly expect very high 
out-of-equilibrium-prices at the beginning of the restart phase of CT-restart-nominal 
although they had equilibrium expectations for the preceding 10 periods of the post-shock-
phase. This pattern indicates that money illusion, or beliefs about other players’ money 
illusion, have a strong effect on expectation formation in the complements treatment. In 
contrast, money illusion does not affect price expectations in ST-restart-nominal nearly as 
much, because the upwards jump at the beginning of the restart phase is much smaller (see 
Figure 6b).  
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The expectation pattern in the post-shock phase illustrated in Figure 6b further 
supports the view that the strategic environment also affects the extent of bounded 
rationality. The figure indicates that money illusion strongly affects expectations in the 
complements treatment because expectations are much more sticky in CT-nominal than in 
CT-real. Again, this pattern in the complements treatment contrasts sharply with the 
results in the substitutes treatment. In the latter, money illusion has no impact at all 
because the expectations in ST-nominal and ST-real are virtually indistinguishable from 
each other. These observations indicate that bounded rationality has less impact on 
expectation formation in the substitutes treatment.  
An examination of the correctness of players’ expectations across treatments further 
supports this view. Figure 8 shows the percentage of subjects with correct expectations 
during the post-shock phase in the two main treatments. The percentage of subjects with 
exactly correct expectations in periods 16-18 and 19-21 is roughly twice as high in the ST 
as in the CT. Moreover, more subjects in the ST exhibit correct expectations throughout 
the entire post-shock phase.19 Taken together, the evidence thus suggests that the strategic 
environment has a strong effect on expectation formation. It seems that bounded 
rationality is more pervasive under strategic complementarity, rendering the players’ 
expectations much more sticky and less rational. 
* Insert Figure 8 about here * 
This result initially appears to be rather puzzling, because we kept everything 
constant that can be kept constant across the ST and the CT. In particular, the cost of 
deviations from best reply behavior is exactly identical across treatments and if subjects 
play a best reply they earn exactly the same amount of money. Likewise, the cost of a 
given expectation error is identical across treatments. For example, if a subject mispredicts 
the others’ average price by x units, the individual payoff is reduced by the same amount 
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regardless of whether the subject is in the ST or the CT. Therefore, the cost of an 
expectation error in both treatments increases proportionally with the expectation error. 
The only difference between the ST and the CT is the slope of the best reply function in 
(Pi, iP− )-space.  
This difference has important consequences, however. It means that adaptive and 
sticky expectations cause a much larger expectation error in the ST than in the CT. As a 
result, the payoff-loss associated with adaptive expectations is considerably larger, 
rendering the error more salient in the ST. In addition, it means that subjects in the ST can 
gain much more if they move from adaptive (sticky) to rational expectations. We illustrate 
this difference between strategic complementarity and substitutability with the help of 
Figure 9. This figure shows the pre-shock and the post-shock best reply functions under 
complementarity and substitutability. For simplicity, and to ease the graphical exposition, 
we assumed a symmetric game in Figure 9 so that the equilibrium is given at the 
intersection between the best reply function and the 45-degree line. The pre-shock 
equilibrium is given by point A, the post-shock equilibrium by point A’. It is important to 
keep in mind that the shock in Figure 9 is purely nominal and the required price 
adjustments (from A to A’) are also purely nominal. Figure 9 thus constitutes a nominal 
representation of the monetary shock. This shock could not be represented in the space of 
real prices, i.e., in (Pi/M, iP− /M)-space, because a monetary shock does not change the 
best reply functions in this space.  
*Insert Figure 9 about here* 
For our purposes, the key feature of Figure 9 is that adaptive expectations imply a 
much larger nominal price adjustment after the shock in the ST compared to the CT. If an 
individual subject expects that others’ average price iP−  in the first period after the shock 
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is given by the average price in the pre-shock equilibrium A, AP , the subject will choose 
the price PB in the CT and PB’ in the ST (see Figure 9, PB and PB’ are the individual prices 
that correspond to point B and B’, respectively). If, however, all subjects behave in this 
way, i.e., if all choose PB in the CT and PB’ in the ST, the average price will be at CP =PB 
in the CT and 'CP =PB’ in the ST. As a consequence, the expectation error in the CT, which 
is given by ( AP  – CP ) on the horizontal axis, is much smaller than the expectation error in 
the ST, which is given by ( AP  – 'CP ). Thus, adaptive expectations after a nominal shock 
imply a much larger expectation error in the ST than in the CT, implying that the error is 
much more salient and associated with larger costs in the ST.  
The previous argument assumes that all players have adaptive expectations. 
However, the argument holds regardless of the number of adaptive players in the group. 
To demonstrate this property in more detail, Table VI shows the expectation error of 
adaptive players in both treatments conditional on the number of adaptive and rational 
players in a group. The table shows that, irrespective of the prevailing mix of adaptive and 
rational players in a group, the expectation error implied by adaptive expectations is 
always larger in the ST. For example, if one of the x-players and both y-players have 
adaptive expectations, the expectation error of the x-player is 2 in the CT and 17 in the ST. 
If subjects play a best reply to their expectation, larger expectation errors are associated 
with lower payoffs. In other words, the benefits from avoiding the error are larger in the 
ST. The higher benefits from rational expectations can also be illustrated from a different 
perspective. If, in the symmetric case of Figure 9, a subject expects the other players in the 
group to have adaptive expectations (and expects them to choose a best reply to this 
expectation), the expected average price will be at CP = PB in the CT and 'CP = PB’ in the 
ST. If the player chooses a best reply to this expectation, he chooses price PC in the CT 
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and PC’ in the ST (PC and PC’ are the individual prices that correspond to point C and C’, 
respectively). Thus, the rational subject’s price is relatively close to the price PB of the 
adaptive subjects in the CT whereas the rational subject’s price is very different from PB’ 
in the ST. However, this is just another way of saying that, in the ST, the rational action is 
saliently different from the action implied by adaptive expectations and, therefore, the 
subject’s payoff gain from rational expectations is relatively high in the ST compared to 
the CT. It seems plausible that at least some subjects responded to these differences in the 
saliency of the error implied by adaptive expectations and the associated payoff gains 
from rational expectations. This then gives us a natural explanation for the fact that more 
players in the CT had backward looking, sticky, and incorrect expectations.  
* Insert Table VI about here * 
In view of our interpretation that the differences in the stickiness and rationality of 
expectations across the CT and ST were caused by differences in the saliency and the 
costliness of the error associated with sticky expectations across these two treatments, one 
might speculate how an increase in the stake size would affect post-shock adjustment in 
our experiment. The answer to this question depends on whether the higher saliency or the 
higher economic cost of an expectation error is primarily responsible for the reduction of 
bounded rationality in the ST. If the higher saliency of the error is the primary cause of a 
reduction in bounded rationality, an increase in stake size will not cause fewer mistakes. 
However, even if the economic costliness of the error is also important, an increase in 
stakes may not completely remove the error. So far there is little evidence for the claim 
that bounded rationality will vanish if the stake size in the laboratory is increased. The 
meta-analysis by Camerer and Hogarth (1999), which includes experiments in which 
subjects could earn the income of three months in less than two hours, reports that higher 
stakes often do not affect mean behavior but they reduce the variance in individual 
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behaviors. In tasks where performance is responsive to effort and skills are relatively 
unimportant, higher stakes tend to improve mean performance. However, Camerer and 
Hogarth also report (1999, p. 7) that “no replicated study has made rationality violations 
disappear purely by raising incentives”. Therefore, the behavioral differences between CT 
and ST may well survive higher stake levels. In this context it is also worthwhile to point 
out that our design basically removed all sources of bounded rationality related to the 
computation of a best reply. It may be that such additional sources of error and uncertainty 
make subjects more conservative and thus more prone to anchoring and money illusion 
effects.  
Another question is whether money illusion and anchoring lose force if monetary 
shocks occur repeatedly. Here, we believe, one has to distinguish between repeated 
identical shocks and repeated non-identical shocks. If the same subjects play the same 
experiment several times there is a high chance that the impact of bounded rationality on 
post-shock adjustment gradually decreases. However, if subjects are exposed to different 
monetary shocks, as it is typically the case in reality, we have much less confidence that 
the impact of bounded rationality decreases with experience. 20
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF NOMINAL INERTIA  
AND EXPECTATION FORMATION 
In this section we discuss the extent to which different theories of nominal inertia are 
compatible with the facts in our experiment. We hope that the following short discussion 
induces macroeconomic theorists to take the characteristic features of our data in their 
future work into account. It is obvious that models based on best-reply behavior and fully 
rational expectations cannot explain our results because such models imply instantaneous 
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adjustment to the new equilibrium independent of the treatment condition. It is equally 
obvious that theories that are based on contractual (Fischer (1977)) or informational 
(Lucas (1972)) frictions cannot explain the sticky adjustment in the CT; nor can they 
explain the rapid adjustment in the ST. This follows simply from the fact that neither such 
informational nor contractual frictions existed in our experiments. The theories by Sargent 
(1993) or Evans and Honkapohja (2001) are based on the assumption that agents are 
backward looking in the sense that they run least squares regressions on past data which 
are used to form expectations about future prices. These theories cannot explain the 
differences between the CT and the ST at the beginning of the post-shock phase because 
the players in both treatments experienced very similar prices before the shock. Figure 1 
shows that the players played very close to the pre-shock equilibrium for a large number 
of periods both in the CT and the ST. This implies that least square regressions on past 
data lead to very similar expectations in both treatments at the beginning of the post-shock 
phase. Figure 4 shows, however, that subjects’ expectations were very different in the first 
post-shock period.21  
The previous section has shown that the theory of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) 
could, in principle, explain why adjustment is rapid in the ST and slow in the CT. In fact, 
this approach inspired the current study and thus contributed to the insights of this paper. 
However, this theory has difficulties in explaining the much higher frequency of sticky 
expectations in the CT and the fact that subjects’ expectations in the CT are less rational 
than in the ST (as shown in Figure 8). If the degree of subjects’ rationality is constant 
across treatments, then the percentage of correct expectations should be the same. The 
theory of near-rational behavior by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) also does not seem to be 
able to capture the differences between the CT and the ST. This theory rests on the idea 
that the deviation from the optimal price choice causes only second-order losses for the 
individual in an interior equilibrium in a price-setting game where agents face smooth and 
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concave payoff functions. Therefore, the gains from fully optimal price setting are small 
so that a percentage of the agents do not play a best reply to their expectations. The theory 
assumes, however, rational expectations. We observe exactly the opposite result in our 
experiments: subjects do play their best reply but many of them have incorrect 
expectations in the CT. In this context one should, however, keep in mind that we 
deliberately implemented a design in which deviations from best-reply behavior are 
associated with first-order losses so that subjects had a strong incentive to play best 
replies. This design feature allows us to isolate the impact of the strategic environment on 
expectation formation. Therefore, in environments with payoff functions that are relatively 
flat in the vicinity of the best reply, the theory by Akerlof and Yellen may well be 
relevant.  
Mankiw and Reis (2002) recently proposed the concept of sticky information. Their 
model is consistent with one aspect of our data: players play best replies to their 
expectations so that the stickiness of expectations is the driving force behind nominal 
inertia. Thus, the model is broadly consistent with the stickiness of price expectations in 
the post-shock phase of the CT. However, it cannot account for the differences between 
the CT and the ST. Reis (2006) provides a micro-foundation for the assumption of sticky 
information by assuming that agents face costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing 
information. This view is consistent with the idea that the differences in the gains from 
rational expectations between the CT and the ST are a driving force behind our treatment 
differences. For, if agents have no costs of forming rational expectations, any gain, 
however small, from rational expectations should induce them to form their expectations 
rationally. If, however, the agents have cognitive or other costs of forming their 
expectations rationally, an increase in the gains will make it worthwhile for some 
additional agents to form rational expectations.  
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The papers by Evans and Ramey (1992, 1998) and Brock and Hommes (1997) 
introduce the idea that forming rational expectations is cognitively costly. In these papers, 
the agents take the cognitive costs and the benefits of different expectation formation rules 
into account when they decide which rule to use. In Evans and Ramey (1992), the authors 
were able to show that this principle of expectation formation may lead to an equilibrium 
where nobody has rational expectations or one where everybody incurs the calculation 
cost and, hence, everybody exhibits rational expectations. Therefore, depending on the 
costs and benefits of calculating rational expectations, the model is consistent both with 
slow and gradual adjustment as well as with instantaneous adjustment towards 
equilibrium. We believe that the strong behavioral differences between the CT and the ST 
provide support for these approaches because they are associated with strong differences 
in the cognitive costs and economic benefits of forming rational expectations.22  
 
5. SUMMARY 
There is now considerable evidence indicating that a share of the people is not fully 
rational, but in strategic interactions, aggregate outcomes are more than just the 
summation of individual behavior. Therefore, it is in principle possible that a large 
fraction of boundedly rational agents nevertheless will end up in a situation that is 
predicted by rational choice models. Yet, it is also possible that a small share of 
boundedly rational agents has a large effect on the behavior of the rational agents, so that 
aggregate behavior is driven away from the rational prediction. In view of these different 
possibilities, it is important to know when bounded rationality matters and when it does 
not affect aggregate outcomes. We examined this question in the context of an important 
economic problem – the adjustment of nominal prices after a fully anticipated negative 
monetary shock.  
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In our experiments, the adjustment of nominal prices is instantaneous, and real 
effects of the monetary shock are absent if all players have rational expectations and play 
a best reply to their expectation. This holds regardless of whether subjects’ actions are 
strategic complements or strategic substitutes. In fact, however, the strategic environment 
has a decisive impact on the nature and the speed of the adjustment process. When 
strategic complementarity prevails, adjustment to the new equilibrium is very slow and 
associated with large effects on subjects’ real income. Under strategic substitutability, 
adjustment is extremely rapid. The evidence indicates that differences in the stickiness of 
price expectations are the key to understanding these results. If actions are complements, 
expectations are very sticky, while if actions are substitutes, expectations are very flexible. 
Since the players almost always choose a best reply to their expectations, the differences 
in the inertia of price expectations translate into differences in actual price adjustment.  
The data suggests that the complements condition not only provides incentives for 
the rational types to (partly) mimic the behavior of the adaptive players, but it also renders 
the subjects’ expectations less forward looking and less rational relative to the substitutes 
treatment. The key difference between strategic substitutes and strategic complements – 
the slope of the best reply function – provides a plausible explanation for the pattern of 
expectations described above, by implying that adaptive expectations are associated with a 
much larger expectation error in the substitutes treatment than in the complements 
treatment. Therefore, the error that adaptive expectations imply is more salient and more 
costly in the substitutes treatment. As a consequence, the cognitive costs of forming 
rational expectations are likely to be lower under substitutability, whereas the economic 
gains from forming rational expectations are higher. Thus, our results provide support for 
theories which assume that the degree of rationality with which the players form 
expectations is not exogenously given but responds to the cognitive costs and the 
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economic gains associated with rationality. Such theories have been proposed by Evans 
and Ramey (1992, 1998), Brock and Hommes (1997) and, more recently, by Reis (2006).  
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APPENDIX A -- FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION OF PAYOFFS 
 
Subjects received the information about the payoff function in the form of a matrix (see 
appendix D in the supplementary materials). For completeness, we also describe players’ payoff 
functions here in analytical terms. Since we kept everything constant across treatment 
conditions with the exception of the slope of the best reply function, the analytical 
representation of the payoffs is a bit complicated. The real payoff function for all i is:  
2 2
381
1 ( / b  function)i
vi P M est reply−
= + + ∆ −  
The table below shows the best reply for player i for every feasible average price of the other 
players iP− .  is the equilibrium price for player i, 
*
iP
*
iP−  is the average price of the other players 
in equilibrium. M is the nominal shift variable. For the numerical values of these parameters, 
please refer to Table I. 
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TABLE AI 
BEST REPLY FUNCTION IN THE COMPLEMENTS AND THE SUBSTITUTES 
TREATMENT 
 
If the average price of the other 
firms, iP− , is in the range  
Player i’s best reply in the 
strategic complements 
treatment is given by 
Player i’s best reply in the 
strategic substitutes 
treatment is given by 
                    
* *P P Pi i i
M M M
− −≤ −  
 
∆  
*2Pi
M
− ∆  
   
* * *P P P Pi i i i
M M M M
∆− − −− ≤ ≤ −  A
P i
M
−+  A P i
M
−−  
     
* *P P Pi i i
M M M
∆− − −− ≤ ≤ + ∆  
*Pi
M
 
*Pi
M
 
    
* *P P Pi i i
*Pi
M M M M
∆− − −+ ≤ ≤ +  2A
P i
M
−+ − ∆  2A P i
M
−− + ∆  
 
* *P P Pi i i
M M M
− −+ ≤  
*2Pi
M
− ∆  ∆  
where A = -1/21  if type x 
A =  3/21  if type y 
∆ = 1/21 for both types 
A = 23/21 if type x 
A = 25/21 if type y 
∆ = 1/21 for both types 
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1  We thank three anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions that helped us to 
improve the paper. We also acknowledge helpful comments from participants of seminars at Harvard 
University, Princeton University, the Stockholm School of Economics, the Swiss National Bank 
(Zurich), the Center for Financial Studies and the Bundesbank (Frankfurt), the Econometric Society and 
the Association of Swiss Economists. Valuable research assistance has been provided by Urs 
Fischbacher, Frederik Øvlisen and Christian Thöni. Financial support by the national center of 
competence in research on “Financial Valuation and Risk Management” is gratefully acknowledged. The 
national centers in research are managed by the Swiss National Science Foundation on behalf of the 
federal authorities. 
2 Price competition in oligopolistic goods markets is often characterized by strategic complementarity 
because if other firms cut prices, individual firms often have an incentive to cut their prices as well. 
Cournot duopoly is a good example of strategic substitutability. The more firm j produces, the less will 
firm i produce. In a macroeconomic context, strategic complementarity plays a role if search frictions 
(Diamond (1982)), informational frictions (Bryant (1983)) or increasing returns (Weitzman (1982)) are 
important. For a general account of the role of strategic complementarity in macroeconomic models, see 
Cooper (1999). Oh and Waldmann (1990), Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993, 1996) and Blinder, Canetti, 
Lebow, and Rudd (1998) provide evidence for the relevance of strategic complementarity in various 
contexts. Evans and Ramey (1992) demonstrate the role of calculation costs in the context of a macro-
model with strategic complementarity.  
3 There is interesting literature (Nagel (1995), Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998), Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford (2006), Weizsäcker (2003)) on the depth of reasoning in games. However, the focus of this 
literature is not on how strategic substitutes and complements differentially affect behavior, but how 
many steps of iterated reasoning underlie subjects’ behavior in games that can be solved by iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. This literature also does not deal with how monetary shocks 
affect nominal inertia. Woodford (2002) investigates how limited information operating through higher-
order expectations can imply powerful effects of monetary policy. While his paper assumes fully rational 
agents, the implications of limited information and limited rationality can be rather similar. More 
recently, Potters and Suetens (2005) and Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2006) 
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examined the role of complements and substitutes for equilibrium play empirically, and Fehr and Tyran 
(2005) provide a discussion of the role of the strategic environment for the relevance of bounded 
rationality at the aggregate level.  
4  Insufficient behavioral adjustment towards the correct solution is an inherent feature of the anchoring 
heuristic. Therefore, it might be better to use the term “anchoring and insufficient adjustment heuristic” 
but for convenience we use the term “anchoring” in this paper.  
5  On the concept of money illusion see Howitt (1989). For effects of money illusion on individual 
behavior see Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997), for potential effects on markets see Howitt (2002) or 
Tyran (2007). 
6  In Fehr and Tyran (2007), for example, money illusion causes striking differences in equilibrium 
selection. All subjects quickly converge to the Pareto-efficient equilibrium in the real payoff condition, 
where the real payoff of each player is highest. In contrast, a large number of subjects plays close to the 
inefficient equilibrium in the nominal payoff condition because this equilibrium corresponds to high 
prices and, consequently, to high nominal payoffs. Thus, although these subjects suffer in real terms 
from playing the bad equilibrium, they coordinate on the high nominal payoffs in the inefficient 
equilibrium, indicating the existence of money illusion.  
7  A clean isolation of the impact of strategic complements versus substitutes forces us to set up a price 
setting game that cannot be derived from usual market structures such as oligopoly or monopolistic 
competition. We believe, however, that this does not question the potential importance of our results for 
behavior outside the laboratory. To the extent to which firms’ profit functions under monopolistic or 
oligopolistic competition exhibit similar degrees of strategic complementarity as the payoff functions in 
our experiment, we even have reason to believe that nominal inertia is stronger in reality because of the 
possibility that preferences for conditional cooperation may increase the overall degree of strategic 
complementarity. In addition, a negative monetary shock may constitute a coordination device for 
conditionally cooperative firms to collude at least temporarily to keep nominal prices high after the 
shock because this enables them to extract more rents from the consumers.  
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8 To see that homogeneity of degree zero implies neutrality, note that a change in M from M0 to λM0 = M1 
leaves real payoffs unaffected if prices change to λPi and λ iP− . Moreover, if Pi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, is a best 
reply to  at M0, λPi also is a best reply to λiP− iP− iP
iP
 at λM0. Thus, if * for all i is a pre-shock 
equilibrium, then λ * for all i is the post-shock equilibrium. 
9  Instructions and payoff tables can also be found in the working paper version of this paper (Fehr and 
Tyran 2002) on http://www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp130.pdf  
10  Appendix C shows that the slope of the best reply function is zero around the equilibrium. Otherwise, the 
absolute value of the slope is one (except for very high levels of others’ average prices). The zero slope 
around the equilibrium may speed up adjustment towards equilibrium because it may make it easier for 
the subjects to find the equilibrium. However, as this feature of the best reply function is identical across 
treatments, it cannot affect differences in adjustment speed between the ST and the CT. We avoided 
absolute slopes larger than one because – if implemented globally – this would have implied unstable 
equilibria; in addition, we also wanted to avoid varying slopes that give rise to multiple equilibria. 
11 Subjects were given a total of ten minutes between distribution of the new tables and their decision. 
During the first 7 minutes, subjects could not enter any decision into the computer. Within the remaining 
3 minutes, the average subject decided after 38 seconds in the CT and after 39 seconds in the ST. Very 
few subjects used up the available time entirely (two subjects in the CT and none in the ST took their 
decision less than 10 seconds before the available time had elapsed). Thus, if we observe disequilibrium 
play, this cannot be due to binding time constraints.  
12  The deviation from equilibrium is somewhat larger in the complements treatment in periods 1 and 2 of 
the pre-shock phase. This is likely to be due to the fact that – in the pre-shock phase – there are more 
strictly dominated strategies in the feasible price range (i.e., for prices between 1 and 30) in the ST than 
in the CT, which makes it easier to reach equilibrium in the ST. However, subjects played the 
equilibrium in the ST and the CT from period 2 onwards. Note that after the shock, the number of 
strictly dominated strategies within the feasible price range is the same across treatments.  
13 To prevent linear dependence among the regressors, we included no dummy variable for period 15 of the 
CT.  
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14 If a subject does not exactly know the true value of iP− , the computation of the best reply requires that 
the whole subjective distribution over iP−  is taken into account. However, for simplicity, in the 
following we use the term “best reply” in the sense of a best reply to the expectation of iP− .   
15 The only exception is the interval between 4 and 6. Note, however, that only one percent of the price 
expectations are in this interval, so that the deviation between actual price and best reply is probably due 
to the small number of observations. Note also that, in both treatments, more than 80 percent of the post-
shock choices represent exact best replies and the rest of the choices is typically close to the exact best 
reply.  
16  We had 4 groups in CT-restart-real and 4 groups in CT-restart-nominal. All 8 groups received real 
payoff tables in the post-shock phase. We therefore pool all 8 groups under the label CT-real in the post-
shock phase of Figure 6a and 6b. We then have 4 groups in the restart phase with real payoff tables 
(labeled CT-restart-real) and 4 groups with nominal payoff tables (labeled CT-restart-nominal). The 
same convention applies to the graphs of ST-real and ST-restart-nominal. This pooling of observations is 
justified because there are no behavioral differences across the pooled treatments during the post-shock 
phase.  
17 Our results regarding adjustment speed vary slightly depending on whether we assume that x- or y-
players are rational. The quantitative differences are, however, very small. In Figure 7a, for instance, the 
graph for the case where only the x-player is fully adaptive is almost identical to the case where only the 
y-player is fully adaptive (this case is not shown in the graph).  
18 A similar conclusion emerges if cognitive hierarchy theory (Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004)) is applied 
to explain subjects’ behavior in period 16. The key assumption of this theory is that players exhibit 
different degrees of rationality and are unaware that there are players like themselves or of higher 
rationality: players of type zero choose randomly, players of type 1 choose the best reply to the actions 
of type zero players, players of type 2 best reply to the actions of type 0 and type 1 players, etc. The nice 
feature of this theory is that it provides precise quantitative predictions once a single parameter is fixed. 
This parameter then also determines the distribution of player types. Conversely, it is possible to estimate 
the parameter and, hence, the distribution of player types for a given distribution of behavior. If the 
distribution of player types is estimated with the data of the first post shock period, the best-fitting 
estimates for our two treatments show that the percentage of players with higher degrees of rationality is 
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considerably larger in the ST. For example, the percentage of players of type 0, 1, 2, 3 and ≥4 in the CT 
is given by 60.7%, 30%, 7.6%, 1.3% and 0.4%, respectively. In contrast, the estimated percentages in the 
ST are given by 8.3%, 21%, 26%, 22% and 22.7%.  
19 Chi-Square tests indicate that the treatment differences displayed in Figure 8 are significant at the 1 
percent level in each interval.  
20  Note also that in an environment with multiple equilibria money illusion may cause coordination on 
Pareto-inefficient equilibria. Fehr and Tyran (2007) show explicitly that even if most or all individual 
subjects may eventually learn to pierce the veil of money, individual learning does not suffice to avoid 
mis-coordination. As long as rational subjects believe that other subjects prefer the bad equilibrium 
because of money illusion, rational subjects best reply by also playing the bad equilibrium.  
21  Note that although least squares (LS) learning models cannot account for behavior and expectations in 
the first post-shock period, they may be capable of capturing part of the differential adjustment across ST 
and CT in subsequent periods because LS models incorporate a (quadratic) loss function. Therefore, an 
LS learner would react to the larger forecast errors in the ST compared to the CT, shown in Figure 9, by 
adapting estimates in the ST more rapidly toward the equilibrium. We are grateful to one of the referees 
for pointing this out to us.  
22  The more extreme stickiness results in Evans and Ramey (1992) occur when the slope of the best reply 
function is relatively close to 1, i.e., for a relatively high degree of strategic complementarity. This is 
interesting insofar as the slope of the best reply function in the complements treatment is 1, lending 
further support to the idea that costly cognition is the driving force behind our treatment differences.  
 
TABLE I  
OVERVIEW OF PARAMETERS 
 Strategic 
Complements (CT) 
Strategic 
Substitutes (ST) 
Group size n = 4 n = 4 
Information feedback  
in period t 
P i vi− ,  P i vi− ,  
Representation of payoffs nominal  ( )P ivi−  nominal  ( )P ivi−  
Real equilibrium payoff 39 39 
A
ll 
pe
ri
od
s 
Choice variables P
i
= { ,2, ... ,30)1   Pi = { ,2, ... ,30)1  
Money supply M0 42 42 
Average equilibrium price 
P * and average equilibrium 
expectation for the whole group 
25 25 
Equilibrium price for type x 22 22 
Equilibrium expectation for 
type x 
26 26 
Equilibrium price for type y 28 28 P
re
-s
ho
ck
 p
er
io
ds
 
Equilibrium expectation for 
type y 
24 24 
Money supply M1 = M0/2 21 21 
Average equilibrium price 
P * and average equilibrium 
expectation for the whole group 
12.5 12.5 
Equilibrium price for type x 11 11 
Equilibrium expectation for 
type x 
13 13 
Equilibrium price for type y 14 14 
Equilibrium expectation for 
type y 
12 12 
Number of dominated strategies 
for type x 
9 9 
Number of dominated strategies 
for type y 
6 6 
Po
st
-s
ho
ck
 p
er
io
ds
 
Slope of reaction function + 1 or 0 - 1 or 0 
TABLE II 
OVERVIEW OF TREATMENTS 
 
   Representation of payoffs 
 Treatment label  Pre-shock phase  (M = M0, 15 periods) 
Post-shock phase 
(M = M1, 15 periods) 
Restart phase 
(M = M1, 10 periods)  
CT 
(10 groups) 
    Nominal Nominal -- 
 
Main treatments 
ST 
(9 groups) 
     
   
Nominal Nominal --
CT-restart-real 
(4 groups) 
Real Real Real 
CT-real 
(8 groups) CT-restart-nominal 
(4 groups) 
Real   
   
   
Real Nominal
ST-restart-real 
(3 groups) 
Real Real Real
 
 
 
 
 
Control treatments  
ST-real 
(6 groups) ST-restart-nominal 
(3 groups) 
Real Real Nominal
CT indicates a complements treatment, ST a substitutes treatment. “Real” indicates that subjects received payoff tables in real terms 
while “Nominal” indicates that they received nominal payoff tables. 
 
 
TABLE III 
DEVIATION OF PRICES FROM POST-SHOCK EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 Strategic Complements 
treatment 
(CT) 
Strategic Substitutes 
treatment 
(ST) 
Post-shock period Coefficient αt Coefficient βt
1 6.600*** - 1.167 
2 5.175*** 0.194 
3 4.275*** - 0.028 
4 3.425*** 0.000 
5 2.950*** - 0.139 
6 2.375*** - 0.111 
7 1.625** - 0.167 
8 1.475** 0.056 
9 1.000 0.000 
10 0.800 0.083 
11 0.275 0.000 
12 - 0.050 0.000 
13 0.000 0.000 
14 - 0.025 0.000 
15 - 0.528 
 
Notes: ∑∑
==
−+=− 15
1
14
1
*
1 )1(
t
tt
t
ttjt ddPP βα  
dt = 1 if price observation in period t is from CT 
 
*** significant at p = 0.001,  
** significant at p = 0.01,  
* significant at p = 0.05. 
 
 
 TABLE IV 
PERCENTAGES OF NOMINAL PRICE CHOICES ABOVE, IN AND BELOW EQUILIBRIUM 
(SUBJECTS AS UNITS OF OBSERVATION) 
 Strategic Complements Strategic Substitutes 
 
Period 
Above 
equilibrium 
In 
equilibrium 
Below 
equilibrium 
Above 
equilibrium 
In 
equilibrium 
Below 
equilibrium 
13 - 15 3 93 5 1 96 3 
16 75 23 3 14 67 19 
17 75 23 3 19 67 14 
18 68 28 5 3 92 6 
19 - 21 48 51 1 1 97 2 
22 - 24 34 65 1 3 96 1 
25 - 27 18 77 6 3 96 1 
28 - 30 2 94 4 1 99 0 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE V 
DEVIATION OF EXPECTATIONS FROM POST-SHOCK EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 Strategic Complements 
treatment 
(CT) 
Strategic Substitutes 
treatment 
(ST) 
Post-shock period Coefficient αt Coefficient βt
1 8.025*** 0.917 
2 6.325*** - 0.083 
3 4.950*** 0.056 
4 3.800*** 0.000 
5 3.100*** 0.000 
6 2.825*** - 0.083 
7 2.000** - 0.139 
8 1.525* - 0.111 
9 1.225 0.028 
10 0.625 0.028 
11 0.400 0.000 
12 - 0.050 0.000 
13 - 0.050 0.028 
14 - 0.050 - 0.028 
15 - 0.028 
 
Notes: ∑∑
==
−+=− 15
1
14
1
*
1 )1(
t
tt
t
ttjt ddEE βα  
where jtE  is group j’s average expectation of others’ average price in period t, and 
*
1E  is the 
average equilibrium expectation. dt = 1 if a price observation in period t is from the CT. 
 
*** significant at p = 0.001,  
** significant at p = 0.01,  
* significant at p = 0.05. 
 
 
 
 TABLE  VI 
EXPECTATION ERROR IMPLIED BY ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS  
IN THE FIRST POST-SHOCK PERIOD 
 Set of adaptive players in a group 
(y) and (x) indicate whether the displayed error is committed by a y- or an x-player 
 1y 
(y) 
2y 
(y) 
1x,1y 
(y) 
2x,1y 
(y) 
1x,2y 
(y) 
2x,2y 
(y) 
1x 
(x) 
2x 
(x) 
1x,1y 
(x) 
2x,1y 
(x) 
1x,2y 
(x) 
2x,2y 
(x) 
Complements  
Treatment 
3 2 3 2 2 2 6 4 3 3 2 2 
Substitutes 
Treatment 
11 12 14 16 16 22 12 14 18 17 17 24 
If all players in a group have adaptive expectations the 2x,2y column is relevant. The numbers in this column then 
indicate the expectation error of a player with adaptive expectations. The symbols in parentheses, (x) or (y), indicate 
whether the displayed error is committed by an x or a y player. The other columns have to be interpreted according to the 
same rules, i.e., if one x-player and two y-players have adaptive expectations the two columns indicated by 1x,2y are 
relevant.   
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Nominal Average Prices over Time in the Main Treatments 
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FIGURE 2A: Distribution of Individual Price Choices in Period 16 (x-types) 
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FIGURE 2B: Distribution of Individual Price Choices in Period 16 (y-types) 
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 FIGURE 3A: Actual Average Prices and Average Best Reply for given Expectations 
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FIGURE 3B: Actual Average Prices and Average Best Reply for given Expectations 
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FIGURE 4: Average Price Expectations over Time in the Main Treatments 
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 FIGURE 5: Efficiency Losses during the Post-Shock Phase of the Main Treatments 
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FIGURE 6A: Average Prices in the Post-Shock and the Restart Phase across Treatments 
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FIGURE 6B: Average Price Expectations in the Post-Shock and the Restart Phase across 
Treatments 
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 FIGURE 7A: Simulations of Price Adjustment with Varying Numbers of Adaptive Players 
in the Substitutes Treatment (ST) 
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FIGURE 7B: Simulations of Price Adjustment with Varying Numbers of Adaptive Players 
in the Complements Treatment (CT) 
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 FIGURE 8:  Percentage of Correct Expectations during the Post-Shock Phase of the Main 
Treatments (CT and ST with Nominal Payoff Tables)  
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FIGURE 9:  Adaptive Expectations under Complementarity and Substitutability 
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